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In 1934 Henry Wallace, then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, wrote a
short book entitled America Must Choose.' In it, he extolled the benefits
to be gained from free trade and pointed out the dangers of continued
protectionism, as institutionalized in the United States' Hawley-Smoot
Tariff Act of 1929 and similar protective measures in Europe and the
world at large. Fortunately, President Franklin Roosevelt took the lead
toward rectifying a messy trade situation. One key step in that direction
was the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934 and its propaga-
tion under the leadership of Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Under the
Act, tariffs and other protective measures were arrested and progres-
sively reduced during the 1930s. Since then, the world has come a long
* Assistant Specialist, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
t Assistant Specialist, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
t Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of
Arizona.
1. HENRY A. WALLACE, AMERICA MUST CHOOSE (1934).
1
Leones et al.: The Dicey Business of Agricultural Trade Policy: Where Does NAFTA
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
way toward further reducing protectionism in global markets. The pro-
gress made under eight rounds of trade negotiations since World War II
(Geneva 1947; Annecy 1949; Torquay 1951; Geneva 1956; Dillon 1960-
61; Kennedy 1964-67; Tokyo 1974-79; Uruguay 1986-92) bear witness to
the trend to reduce or remove barriers to international trade.'
In the mid-1990s, the world faces many important changes in the
trading environment that will put to the test the general trend in favor of
multilateralism that has prevailed since the end of World War II. Space
permits us to mention only the most important of these.3 Foremost
among these changes is that the stimuli provided by the size of the
United States import market and by its relatively open trade policy for
more than three decades can no longer be taken for granted. In fact,
both of these stimuli have faded sharply in importance. Export market
competitors have taken advantage of the openness of American markets,
and it is no longer possible to ignore an annual United States trade deficit
gap of more than $100 billion per year.
Additionally, the success of such U.S.-led efforts as the Marshall
Plan and the Green Revolution has shifted the position of the United
States in many respects. Moreover, in fifty years America has shifted
from a net oil exporter to net importer, and a world of technical parity in
high-tech products has nullified the huge comparative advantage enjoyed
by the United States at the end of World War II.
As a result of these and many other changes in production and
trade, both in the United States and throughout the world, governments
have slowly but surely intervened in the international trade process.
"Managed" trade by governments has emerged often under the euphe-
mism of "fair" trade (not to be confused with fair trade). Non-tariff bar-
riers have replaced the tariffs or customs duties as the favorite instrument
of protection.4 Governments agree to "voluntary" export agreements
when primary importing countries threaten to close their markets com-
pletely. And, equally importantly, regionalism in the form of "special
arrangements," as exemplified by the European Economic Community
2. Since 1980 alone, world merchandize trade has almost doubled and now approaches $4
trillion (U.S.). Since the end of World War II the value of total world trade has increased more than
100-fold. GATT ANNUAL REPORT (1950-1990).
3. A good non-technical elaboration of this phenomenon can be found in Lester Thurow, New
Rules for Playing the Game, 72 NAT'L F., J. PHI KAPPA PHI, 10-13 (YEAR). See also Ron Sandrey &
Jimmye S. Hillman, Emerging Trading Blocs: A Retreat From Multilateralism? XXI International
Conference of Agricultural Economists, Tokyo, Japan (Aug. 22-29, 1991) (Keynote paper for the
concurrent discussion session on Emerging Trading Blocs: A Retreat from Multilateralism?).
4. See JIMMYE S. HILLMAN, TECHNICAL BARRIERS AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE (1991).
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(EEC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), etc., is clearly on the rise. Bilat-
eral negotiations and similar dealings counter to multilateralism, which
are clearly prohibited under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and differ fundamentally from the principle of most-favored-
nation status, are rampant around the world. With appropriate warning,
Professor Thurow has stated the issue quite succinctly:
Most of these negotiations are held under the cover of setting up a
'common market.' Technically, the common-market escape clause
from the [GATT] most-favored-nation principle is supposed to be used
only if the ultimate objective of the common market is a real political
union. Europeans can argue that this is the case in Europe, but in
North America there is not even a pretense that the Canadian, Mexi-
can, and American economic talks are a prelude to political union.
The Structural Impediment Talks between Japan and America did not
even bother with this legal "fig leaf." The world has forgotten what it
learned in the 1920s. Bilateral negotiations cannot lead to a stable
trading system.5
History is rife with examples of arguments by political and eco-
nomic powers-even great powers-for accords whose tenets character-
ize less than fully multilateral trade policy.6 These arguments and the
resulting agreements have always fallen short of the long-range ideal,
although many, such as the British Commonwealth Agreement, begun at
Ottawa in 1932, do solve many temporary and important problems.
However, experience suggests that at least with regard to agricultural
trade, preferential or regional trading blocs can result more in trade di-
version than trade creation. In the agricultural sector this results from
trade-distorting domestic policies, as shown by McCalla.7 In fact, pros-
pects for liberalizing agricultural trade either under the GATT or re-
gional and preferential arrangements are limited unless domestic trade
distorting policies are addressed first.
In this article, we shall explore the possibilities for increasing trade
under one such regional bloc, the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). This agreement has received much attention from the
American public as well as from professional economists over the past
two years: Thus the need for further analysis and elaboration. Before
turning our attention to trade relations between the U.S., Mexico, and
5. Thurow, supra note 3.
6. For an overall view, see JOHN B. CONDLIFFE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS 477-595
(1950).
7. Alex McCalla, GATT Preferential-Regional Trading Blocs and Agricultural Trade. 1 REv.
INT'L ECON. 75-89 (1992).
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Canada, we will discuss the relevance of basic economic trade concepts
to NAFTA.
II. ECONOMIC TRADE THEORY AND NAFTA
The first economic theory of gains from international trade is gener-
ally attributed to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, in 1776. Smith chal-
lenged the mercantilists, who claimed regulation was necessary to
provide a favorable balance of trade (surplus of exports over imports),
and argued for laissez-faire. That is, nations would benefit from free
trade if they were allowed to specialize in the production of a particular
good or set of goods that they could produce at low cost. Smith's theory
of trade is today known as the theory of absolute advantage.
Smith's theory of absolute advantage is incomplete because it as-
sumes that every country can export at least one good as a low cost pro-
ducer. In 1817, David Ricardo published Political Economy and
Taxation, in which he extended Smith's theory by introducing the con-
cept of comparative advantage. The concept of comparative advantage
explains how a country can benefit from trade when it does not have an
absolute cost advantage in any good.
Comparative efficiency is central to the concept of comparative ad-
vantage. For example, if the U.S. can grow 2 bushels of corn or 4 pounds
of tomatoes for $5.00, while Mexico can grow 1 bushel of corn or 3
pounds of tomatoes for $5.00, the U.S. clearly has an absolute cost ad-
vantage in the production of both corn and tomatoes.
The theory of absolute advantage suggests that no gains from trade
are possible in this simplified two-country, two-good scenario. However,
the concept of comparative advantage demonstrates that the U.S. should
export corn to Mexico and Mexico should export tomatoes to the U.S.:
The U.S. gives up only 2 pounds of tomatoes for every bushel of corn
produced, while Mexico forgoes 3 pounds of tomatoes for every bushel of
corn produced. Thus, U.S. has the lowest comparative cost in the pro-
duction of corn. U.S. gives up 1/2 bushel of corn for every pound of
tomatoes produced while Mexico gives up only 1/3 bushel of corn for
every pound of tomatoes raised. Mexico has the lowest comparative
cost, or a comparative advantage, in the production of tomatoes. Gains
from trade (e.g., more total corn and tomatoes) are available to countries
whenever comparative costs of production differ by more than appropri-
ate transportation costs.
Comparative costs of production are determined by the availability
of factors of production-land, labor, technology, and capital inputs.
[Vol. 28:559
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For perishable commodities such as vegetables, seasonal weather varia-
tions will cause the comparative advantage to shift from one region to
another throughout the year. Differences in costs of production for geo-
graphic regions within the U.S. cause goods to flow within the U.S. in a
manner similar to that in which the potential for trade flows beyond
U.S.'s borders. But trade across borders around the world has histori-
cally been complicated by protectionist policies that violate the condi-
tions necessary for trade based solely on comparative advantage and
transportation costs. Broadly speaking, these policies fall under three
categories: Commercial policies; monetary policies; and institutional ar-
rangements. Trade flows that result in response to a set of policies, in-
dustry marketing skills, location, and comparative advantage are referred
to as competitive advantage. Competitive advantage encompasses all
policy and industry forces and the law of comparative advantage. It isimportant to keep in mind that competitive advantage or competitiveness
is often dynamic in nature because of changing macroeconomic
environments.
Free trade allows countries to specialize in producing those goods
and services in which they have a comparative advantage and increase
the total wealth of the participating countries. However, not all sectors
will be "win" as trade becomes more free: In the example given above,
the corn industry in Mexico and U.S. tomato industry would lose. How-
ever, gains for the corn industry in the U.S. and tomato industry in Mex-
ico would more than offset the losses suffered by the other industry in
each country. If there is no way to compensate the losing sectors for
gains in the winning sectors, reducing trade barriers can result in a redis-
tribution of income among sectors in each country.
Comparative and competitive advantage may not be responsive to
social costs that inevitably are a part of a country's total production
costs. For example, social costs of water and air pollution (which are
external to direct production costs), especially those within Mexico and
along the U.S.-Mexico border have been a primary concern of environ-
mentalists. While not every border problem results directly from U.S.-
Mexican trade, environmentalists argue that increased industrialization
along the border has worsened existing environmental problems. Be-
cause the enforcement of environmental regulations in Mexico has been
lax, some U.S. maquiladora8 firms dispose of environmentally harmful
8. Under the Maquila program, businesses export U.S.-made parts to Mexico duty free for
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wastes illegally in Mexico9 even though such firms are required to ship
hazardous wastes back to the U.S. for proper disposal. More than forty
furniture manufacturers that have been unable to meet Southern Califor-
nia's air quality standards have relocated to Mexico.' 0
Proponents of NAFTA, and Mexico in particular, argue that freer
trade is a necessary vehicle for a cleaner and healthier environment. As
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William K. Reilly ar-
gued, "[e]nvironmental improvement will not occur in Mexico ... with-
out the money to reduce pollution, apply new technologies, support
government programs, and pay for inspectors, regulators, and prosecu-
tors."11 In 1991, Mexico spent only 48 cents per person on environmen-
tal protection while, the U.S. spent over $24 per person for the same
purpose. 2 Additionally, Mexico's ability to enforce environmental law
is important since Mexico is noted for having stringent regulations.
However, inadequate staff, training, and technical capabilities have re-
sulted in sporadic and inefficient environmental law enforcement.
External costs, including environmental considerations, are not the
only factors that affect comparative advantage. Indeed, while compara-
tive advantage is a major reason for increased overall output under free
trade, an important outcome of free trade is factor price equalization.
Essentially, in the absence of barriers to trade, the price that consumers
pay for goods and services should become very similar in the trading
countries, thus causing differences in the price of such inputs as labor and
capital to decline. This occurs even in the absence of the free movement
of factors between countries.
Some U.S. observers fear that the NAFTA and a changing eco-
nomic climate in Mexico may induce many U.S. businesses to relocate
abroad and take American jobs with them. Such an exodus would put
additional downward pressure on the wages of low-skill American work-
ers even though it might potentially increase wages for low-skill Mexican
workers. Recent studies have found evidence that factor price equaliza-
tion occurs between countries that have relatively open trade with each
9. Charles McCoy, Study says Firms Dump Toxic Waste at Mexican Plants, WALL ST. J., May
20, 1991, at 12.
10. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 6, 1991, at 32,
41.
11. William K. Reilly, Mexico's Environment Will Improve with Free Trade, WALL ST. J., May
20, 1991, at 12.
12. Satchell, supra note 10, at 36.
[Vol. 28:559
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other. In particular, wages in OECD countries have tended to con-
verge. 13 Countries that restrict trade, on the other hand, have exper-
ienced reduced wage rates.14
Some economists maintain that part of the reason for the decline in
the real wage of low-skill American workers in the last decade has been
increased liberalization of trade.15 Other economists point to many other
factors, including lagging productivity in low-skill sectors and shifts in
labor demand that may or may not be related to changing international
trade relations. 6
The NAFTA may continue to put downward pressure on the wages
of low-skill American workers. However, the positive effect of the
NAFTA on Mexican low-skill labor wages is likely to be much greater
than the negative pressure on U.S. low skill wages because of the relative
sizes of the U.S. and Mexican economies. The Mexican Gross National
Product (GNP) is less than four per cent of the United States' gross na-
tional product (GNP).17
III. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN NAFTA COUNTRIES AND
ECONOMIC CHANGES IN MEXICO
Much of the discussion in this section focuses on changes occurring
in Mexico. In fact, the focus of most analyses of the agricultural provi-
sions of NAFTA has been with Mexico since the Canadian-U.S. Trade
Agreement (CUSTA) has already addressed many agricultural trade is-
sues between Canada and the U.S. and because direct trade between
Mexico and Canada is quite small. Canada's role in the negotiations has
largely been to ensure that Canadian agricultural exports to the U.S. are
not displaced by Mexican farm products. 8 Most agricultural products
fall under Article 401, section C of the CUSTA, which requires a ten-
13. Manouchehr Mokhtari & Farhad Rassekh, The Tendency Towards Factor Price Equaliza-
tion Among OECD Countries, 71 REv. ECON. & STAT. 636-42 (1989).
14. Michael A. Webb & Mark C. Berger, Trade Regimes and Wages, 38 J. DEv. ECON. 119-31
(1992).
15. Aaron Bernstein et al., The Global Economy: Who Gets Hurt, Bus. WK., Aug. 10, 1992, at
48-53.
16. John Bound & George Johnson, Changes in the Structure of Wages in the 1980s: An Evalu-
ation of Alternative Explanations, 82 Am. ECON. REV. 371-92 (1992); Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin M.
Murphy, Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987. Supply and Demand Factors, 107 Q. J. ECON. 35-78
(1992).
17. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT; DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 219 (1992).
18. Karl D. Mielke, A Canadian Perspective of a North American Free Trade Agreement for
Agriculture, NAFTA: NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURE (Vol. 1, 1991).
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year tariff elimination in ten equal and annual periods, duty free on Janu-
ary 1, 1998.19
After decades of inward-looking economic policy, Mexico has begun
to open up to foreign trade and investment.20 It was only in 1986 that
Mexico became a full member of GATT. This shift in economic policy
has been brought about by the U.S. educated technocrats who run Mex-
ico and who see foreign debt and aid-driven economic development as
counterproductive. The motto "trade not aid" seems to have gained mo-
mentum in Mexican government economic development circles. At least
one study, conducted in 1984 by Kim and Turrubiate, indicates that the
change is well justified. The study indicates that a switch from import-
substitution to export-orientation would create substantially more in-
come in Mexico and that import-substitution was especially detrimental
to the poor. The study also indicated that export-oriented agriculture
could create significantly more income for poorer Mexicans than manu-
facturing or the petroleum industry.21 Hence, the importance of agricul-
ture in the NAFTA from a developmental perspective becomes clear.
Even as closed as Mexico was before the mid-1980s, the United
States has long been an important trading partner for Mexico. In 1970,
almost 65% of all imports to Mexico came from the United States, and
over 70% of all exports from Mexico were sold in the United States In
1987, imports from the United States still constituted approximately
66% of all imports into Mexico, while exports to the United States had
declined to 65% of total Mexican exports.22
Mexico is the United States's fourth largest trading partner behind
Canada, Japan and the European Community (EC). Total trade between
the United States and Mexico was $64.5 billion in 1991, more than
double the amount of five years earlier. However, the share of U.S. im-
ports from and exports to Mexico were only 6.4% and 8.3% of total U.S.
imports and exports respectively in 1991. In contrast, 1991 U.S. imports
from and exports to Canada constituted 18.7% and 21.2% of total U.S.
imports and exports respectively. Total trade between Canada and the
19. CAROL GOODLOE & MARK SIMONE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BULLETIN No. 644, A
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA FOR AGRICULTURE: THE ROLE OF CANADA AND THE
U.S.-CANADA AGREEMENT (1992).
20. Mexico. The New Model Debtor, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 85-87.
21. See Kwan S. Kim & Gerard Turrubiate, Structures of Foreign Trade and Income Distribu-
tion: The Case of Mexico, 16 J. DEV. ECON. 263 (1984).
22. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS STATISTICAL OF-
FiCE, 1988 INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS YEARBOOK (Vol. 1, 1990).
[Vol. 28:559
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U.S. reached $176 billion in 1991, up almost 60% from 1984.23
Some observers maintain that the figures on trade between the U.S.
and Mexico are misleading because part of total trade is in the maqui-
ladora sector. In 1989, for example, it was estimated that one-third of all
U.S. exports to and imports from Mexico were in the maquiladora sec-
tor.24 These reports, are somewhat misleading, as two-thirds of all trade
between the United States and Mexico occurs outside of the maquiladora
sector. Not surprisingly, a large portion of U.S. imports to and exports
from Mexico have been within the same general sectors: machinery and
equipment, automotive products, and electronic equipment.
Overall trade flows to and from Mexico have indeed increased since
Mexico joined the GATT, but not as dramatically as the growth in Mexi-
can petroleum exports. Between 1970 and 1985, petroleum as a percent-
age of total Mexican exports increased from 3% to 60%. At the same
time, all food items and agricultural raw material fell from 49% to 9% of
total Mexican exports. Agricultural exports actually increased 270% be-
tween 1970 and 1985, but total, overall exports increased by 1,552% dur-
ing the same period.25 In sum then, Mexico has made significant strides
towards diversifying its exports away from petroleum products since
1985.
Despite the decline in the relative importance of agricultural ex-
ports, agricultural provisions of the NAFTA are of great concern to
Mexico for developmental reasons. Like the economy in all developing
countries, Mexico's economy is substantially more dependent on agricul-
ture than either Canada or the U.S. About 8.1% of Mexico's GNP is
attributed to production agriculture, compared with only 3.2% and
2.6% for Canada and the United States, respectively. Over 26% of Mex-
ico's labor force is employed by agriculture, compared to only 3.6% and
1.3% in Canada and the U.S., respectively.2 6
Over the last two decades, the importance of trade in general has
increased for all three North American countries. Canadian exports and
imports (including services) constituted 44% and 53% of GNP in 1970
and 1987, respectively. United States exports and imports accounted for
only 15% of GNP in 1970, compared to 22% in 1987. In comparison,
23. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN TRADE OF THE UNITED STATES, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS S-17 (July 1992).
24. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MAQUILADORAS AND U.S.-MEXIco TRADE, NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: GENERATING JOBS FOR AMERICANS (UPDATE) (May 1991).
25. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS (Supp. 1987).
26. FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICUL-
TURE 1990-91 20-21, 82-83 (Aug. 1991).
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Mexican exports and imports increased from 18% of GNP in 1970 to
25% in 1987.27
The NAFTA is only one part of a larger change that is occurring in
Mexico's economic institutions. The main motivation behind this change
is not to open the floodgates to foreign made products, but to encourage
foreign investment in Mexico in order to increase Mexican export earn-
ings. 28 The Mexican government has also taken steps to entice Mexican
capitalists to repatriate at least part of the estimated $60-100 billion in
Mexican-owned capital invested abroad.29 As an indication of the size of
this "capital flight," total U.S. direct investment in Mexico amounted to
about $17 billion in 1990, out of total direct foreign investments of $27
billion.30 From the Mexican government's perspective, the NAFTA is
important to assure the foreign and domestic business communities that
the changes currently being made will not be quickly or easily reversed
by future administrations.
In addition to joining the GATT, the Mexican government has im-
proved the investment environment by successfully curbing inflation. It
has privatized most public enterprises and deregulated many important
sectors, including the financial sector. Reform in the financial sector has
made banking less restrictive in some respects than in the U.S. In partic-
ular, financial institutions in Mexico have greater freedom to expand geo-
graphically and to offer a broader range of financial products, including
insurance. However, opportunities for foreign banking activity in Mex-
ico are still fairly limited.31 The national petroleum company (PEMEX)
still contributes about 20% of all government revenues and, notably, is
likely to remain part of the public sector.32
The most recent reforms have included the January 1992 amend-
ment to the Mexican constitution's land tenure and ownership provi-
sions. Individuals are still limited to owning only a maximum of 247
acres of irrigated land for row crops, 720 acres of irrigated land for
orchards, or enough land to raise 500 head of cattle. However, three
important changes were made. First, redistribution of the land is now
27. WORLD BANK, WORLD TABLES VOL. I. (ECONOMIC DATA) (1983 & 1989).
28. Mexico: The New Model Debtor, supra note 20, at 86.
29. Rudiger Dornbusch, Mexico's Economy at the Crossroads, 43 J. INT'L AFF. 313 (1990).
30. NACIONAL FINANCIERA, LA ECONOMIA MEXICANA EN CIFRAS 12D (1991) (copy on file
with authors).
31. JEFFREY GUNTHER & ROBERT R. MOORE, FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ISSUES, FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF DALLAS, MEXICO OFFERS BANKING OPPORTUNITIES (4th Qtr. 1992).
32. MICHAEL SHANE & DAVID STALLINGS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AGRI-
CULTURAL INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 635, THE MEXICAN ECONOMY IN THE 1990's: MAR-
KETS ARE IN; STATE CONTROL IS OUT (Oct. 1991).
[Vol. 28:559
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prohibited. Second, communal or ejido land can now be rented and in
some cases sold. Since ejidos cover roughly three-fourths of all Mexican
farm land and well over half of the irrigated land, this reform could have
major impacts. The third important change is the lifting of a constitu-
tional prohibition against corporate farming. Both foreign and domestic
corporations may farm but, the land that each corporation may own is
limited to 25 times the size of individual holdings. No limit is placed,
however, on the land that corporations can rent. Foreign land ownership
is still prohibited for 100 kilometers inland from all borders and for 50
kilometers inland from the coast. These areas include much of the land
currently in vegetable production in Mexico.33
Although the focus of this article is the potential effects of the
NAFTA on agriculture in the United States, clearly other changes being
made in Mexican laws and regulations will have a major impact on deci-
sions by American, Canadian, and Mexican firms on where to invest and
where to market their products.
IV. OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE BETWEEN THE U.S.,
MEXICO AND CANADA
As previously noted, total 1991 trade flows between Canada and the
United States were nearly $176 billion, or almost three times the $64.5
billion trade flow between the U.S. and Mexico. However, Mexican and
Canadian agricultural trade flows to the U.S. are much closer in value.
Mexico's agricultural trade flows were equivalent in amount to 70% of
Canada's agricultural trade with the U.S. for 1991. U.S. agricultural ex-
ports to Mexico grew 173% between 1986 and 1991, making Mexico the
fastest growing major agricultural export market for the U.S. Currently,
the United States accounts for around 75% of Mexico's agricultural im-
ports and over 57% of Canada's agricultural imports.34
Overall, Japan is the most important export market for U.S. agricul-
ture, followed by the European Community, Canada, and Mexico. How-
ever, Canada and Mexico combined are expected to surpass Japan as the
leading market for U.S. agricultural exports for the first time in 1992,
and are expected to receive $8.3 billion in U.S. farm goods.35 Figures for
33. Roberta Cook & Kenneth Schwedel, Mexico Frees Agricultural Investment (Leaflet No. 10),
U.S.-MExlco FREE TRADE AGRICULTURAL SATELLITE BROADCAST (Nov. 1991); Tom Karst, Lay-
ing Out the Investment Welcome Mat, THE PACKER, Apr. 25, 1992; Tom Karst, Mexico: Land of
Promise?, THE PACKER, Apr. 25, 1992.
34. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL
TRADE STATISTICS OF THE U.S., CALENDAR YEAR 1991 (1992).
35. LORI HUTHOEFER & MIKE DWYER, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE, RUN FOR THE
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Japan and the EC are expected to show $8.1 and $7.1 billion of imported
farm goods from the United States in 1992, respectively. Canada and
Mexico combined have purchased about one-fifth of all U.S. farm exports
since 1990, up from only 10% in 1986. Mexico's trade liberalization,
which began in 1986, and the implementation of CUSTA have definitely
impacted agricultural trade. About 90% of Mexico's agricultural exports
and 37% of Canada's agricultural exports go to the United States. 6 The
importance of the U.S. as a market for both Mexican and Canadian
farmers is thus quite evident.
A. U.S.-Mexico Agricultural Trade
U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico are summarized in Figure 1.
Agricultural imports are led by fresh vegetables, fresh non-citrus fruits,
coffee, live feeder cattle, and non-fruit beverages. Fresh tomatoes are the
most important U.S. fresh vegetable import from Mexico at $249 million
in 1991, yet the United States imported over $370 million in tomatoes in
1990. A healthy U.S. tomato crop (after a 1990 freeze in Florida) and
the continued revaluation of Mexico's peso in relation to the U.S. dollar
were primarily responsible for the decline in tomato imports for 1991. 31
The upward revaluation of Mexico's peso increased the dollar denomi-
nated costs for Mexican producers and reduced their competitive
position.
While over 98% of United States's tomato imports came from Mex-
ico in 1991, that total represented less than 19% of U.S.'s total tomato
supply for the year. Between December and May, Mexican tomatoes
typically account for about 35% of the U.S.'s fresh supply, with Florida
growers supplying most of the balance.
Approximately 40% of the agricultural imports from Mexico al-
ready enter duty free, and the remainder enter at subject to an average
7% ad valorem duty. Many duty free goods imported from Mexico are
complimentary or non-competitive in nature. Non-competitive products
consist of commodities not commercially produced in the U.S. to any
significant extent and include such products as coffee, cocoa, bananas,
tea, rubber, and plantains. In 1991, 17% of agricultural imports from
BORDER U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS TO CANADA AND MEXICO ON THE RISE (AGRICUL-
TURAL TRADE HIGHLIGHTS) 10-11 (June 1992).
36. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMIC REPORT No. 246, AGRICULTURE IN A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
ANALYSIS OF LIBERALIZING TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (Sept. 1992).
37. BARBARA A. CLAFFEY & JOY HARWOOD, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, U.S.-MEXICO
AGRICULTURAL TRADE UNDER A NAFTA (AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK) 32-37 (June 1992).
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Mexico to the United States were classified as "non-competitive." Cof-
fee imports comprised over 78% of "non-competitive" products in 1991.
Other farm goods have entered the U.S. from Mexico duty free through
maquilas and the Generalized System of Preferences program. This pro-
gram is designed to help developing countries by granting specific prod-
ucts duty free access until the product becomes competitive in the world
market.
Before 1987, relatively low-value or bulk commodities like coarse
grains and soybeans dominated the United States's export market to
Mexico. These products are still important exports for the U.S. as
shown in Figure 2, but their importance has greatly diminished. In 1987
bulk commodities accounted for 60% of total agricultural exports to
Mexico, but today make up only 30% of the export market. High-value
products such as meat and poultry products, horticultural produce, dairy
products, hides and skins, snack foods, and soybean meal, have lead in
this category. Animals and animal product exports rose from $662 mil-
lion in 1990 to $1,124 million in 1991 to become the leading export cate-
gory. The increase in live cattle and meat product exports to Mexico
increased so much during 1992 that on November 11, 1992, Mexico im-
posed tariffs of 15% tariff on live cattle, 20% on fresh or chilled beef, and
25% on frozen beef. The previous tariff rate was zero for products im-
ported under an import license.38
Much of the shift from low-value to high-value export products can
be attributed to the fact that unlike high-value commodities, bulk com-
modities were not included in Mexico's trade liberalization reform. In
large part, high-value products were excluded from the reform package
because corn is the staple of the Mexican diet and is produced by many
low-income farmers. About two-thirds of Mexico's corn is grown in
communal farms and around 75% of Mexico's corn is used for human
consumption. In comparison, less than 10% of U.S.'s corn production is
used for domestic human consumption. Flooding the Mexican market
with corn imports would definitely compound Mexico's persistently high
unemployment and underemployment rates. Thus, corn, dry beans, and
non-fat dry milk were classified as most-sensitive goods for Mexico under
NAFTA. Tariffs are scheduled to be phased out and eliminated in 15
years for these goods. Sugar, peanuts, and frozen orange juice concen-
trate are goods classed as most-sensitive for imports into the U.S. under
38. ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, MEXICO IMPOSES IMPORT
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NAFTA. Tariffs on other goods bound for Mexico, such as fresh and
frozen fruits, are scheduled to be phased out and eliminated in 10 years.
Mexico still maintains a relatively high (20%) tariff on most fruits.39
B. U.S.-Canada Agricultural Trade
Agricultural imports from Canada are dominated by animals and
animal products as shown in Figure 3. This category primarily consists
of slaughter cattle, breeding stock, and pork meat products. These prod-
ucts have dominated agricultural imports from Canada throughout the
1980s. Biscuits and wafers are disguised in the grains and feed category,
contributing almost 25% of the total. Potatoes comprise over 30% of
the vegetables and preparations category imported from Canada. The
oilseed and oilseed products category has been the fastest growing import
category from Canada since the exaction of CUSTA. Rapeseed and flax-
seed oil make up over one-half of the oilseed imports from Canada. Im-
ports of non-juice beverages have declined since the enactment of
CUSTA, but are still a significant import commodity at $174 million.
As shown in Figure 4, U.S. exports to Canada are primarily high-
value products such as fresh and processed fruit and vegetables, meat and
poultry products, live animals, nuts, snack foods, and soybean meal. A
diverse group of fresh vegetables are exported to Canada from the
United States with no particular item standing out. Just as has been the
case with U.S. exports to Mexico, growth in high-value products has
been most noteworthy. High-value products now account for 94% of all
agricultural exports to Canada. Low processing costs and climatic fac-
tors in the U.S., in conjunction with CUSTA have contributed to the
growth of high-value product exports. Given the relatively strong U.S.
dollar for Canadian consumers and the stagnant Canadian economy,
growth in high-value exports has been quite remarkable. Not surpris-
ingly, the outlook for expanded trade is most bullish on high-value prod-
ucts.
Export figures for low-value export products such as grains fluctuate
depending on annual production levels. Before CUSTA, U.S. exports of
grain to Canada were permitted only under special licenses that were
rarely issued (generally only when a Canadian drought occurred).
CUSTA eliminated import licenses for U.S. wheat, oats, and related
products. Domestic farm subsidies remained essentially unchanged by
CUSTA, with the exception of the elimination of transportation subsidies
39. BOYD M. BUXTON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, U.S. FRUIT INDUSTRY AND THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (FRUIT AND TREE NUTS) 33-35 (Nov. 1992).
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on Canadian grain exports to the United States. Thus, trading of coarse
grains will continue to depend greatly on annual production variations.
C. Nontariff Technical Barriers and Trade Institutions
Sanitary and phytosanitary regulations protect human, animal, and
plant life from health risks that may arise from diseases, exotic pests,
contaminants, toxins, and chemical residues. Sanitary regulations deal
with human and animal health while phytosanitary regulations provide
for plant protection.4  Some observers believe that sanitary and
phytosanitary rules have been imposed without sufficient scientific evi-
dence and thus that those regulations were erected primarily as trade
barriers to protect domestic markets.41 Reductions in tariff barriers are
sometimes closely followed by a proliferation of additional sanitary and
phytosanitary requirements.42 Under NAFTA, the United States, Can-
ada, and Mexico have agreed to harmonize standards, although no coun-
try is required to lower its current standards.
Most of the focus on sanitary and phytosanitary regulations has
been with Mexico since U.S. and Canadian standards were harmonized
under CUSTA. Another reason is that nearly half of all the fruits and
vegetables imported by the U.S. originate in Mexico: This fact is signifi-
cant because some pesticides that are illegal in the United States for fruits
and vegetables are legal in Mexico. Currently, seventeen identified pesti-
cides can be used in Mexico but are prohibited in the U.S.43 Some pesti-
cides can be used in both the U.S. and Mexico as long as they do not
exceed certain tolerance levels, although the commodities on which they
can be used and the tolerance levels differ. Fifty-eight pesticides have
been identified that have the same tolerance levels in both countries, but
are registered for use on different crops.' Some measures on the part of
the United States to ensure compliance with domestic pesticide regula-
tions are thus in order.
In response to increasing produce shipments from Mexico, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) developed a special program in 1979 to
40. KEN FORSYTHE & LORI LYNCH, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BULLETIN No. 649, EF-
FECTS OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON U.S. AND MEXICAN SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY
REGULATIONS (May 1992).
41. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, PUBLICATION No. 2353, THE LIKELY IMPACT ON THE
U.S. OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO 4-6 (1991).
42. KEN FORSYTHE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENT AND FOOD SAFETY ARE
ISSUES IN U.S.-MEXICO TRADE (AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK) 34-38 (May 1992).
43. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PESTICIDES: COMPARISON OF U.S. AND MEXICAN
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monitor pesticide residues on Mexican produce and to enforce U.S. regu-
lations strictly. FDA uses a sampling plan based on a knowledge of
Mexican pesticide applications and prior testing history. However, less
than 1% of all U.S. food imports, including shipments from Mexico, are
sampled. If a sample is found in violation of residue for U.S. tolerances,
the shipment from which it came will be returned or destroyed. Addi-
tionally, the grower/shipper responsible may be placed on automatic de-
tention. Automatic detention requires the grower/shipper to have a
private pesticide laboratory complete an analysis of residue on any future
food shipments. FDA scrutinizes the scientific procedures of each lab
analysis and continues to test residues randomly. A grower/shipper re-
mains on automatic detention until five consecutive samples are free of
residue violations. Mexico currently has no government agency respon-
sible for enforcing and monitoring pesticide residues. Mexico has, how-
ever, taken steps to assist the private sector in forming a national
laboratory system to test and enforce residue standards.
Overall, residue violations from Mexican produce are higher than
those found on domestic produce. But residue violations for growers
under automatic detention or for growers the FDA suspects have pro-
duce with illegal pesticide residues are somewhat lower than in the U.S.
The majority of Mexican violations occur when the U.S. has no tolerance
for a pesticide on a particular commodity rather than no tolerance for
the pesticide under any circumstances whatsoever. For example, a sam-
pled lettuce head may be found in violation because a pesticide residue is
discovered that has no U.S. tolerance in lettuce, even though the U.S.
might have a tolerance level for this same pesticide on peppers.
Although the United States, Canada, and Mexico have agreed to
"upwardly harmonize" standards, the perceived need for certain pesti-
cides and the health threat of diseases and pathogens varies greatly de-
pending on climate, growing conditions, and culture.4" Thus, sanitary
and phytosanitary standards will probably be the most formidable obsta-
cle for free trade to overcome. The ability to legally settle disputes of this
nature in an acceptable manner among countries will greatly determine
the extent to which regional or multinational trading and investment ex-
ist in the future for agricultural products.
45. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (INTERNATIONAL DIVISION), A GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR U.S. BUSINESS (1992).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NAFTA
A. NAFTA as a Form of Managed Trade
In the presence of a GATT agreement, it is possible to argue that
the NAFTA does little to further free trade. The presence of the GATT
does raise the question of whether the objectives of the NAFTA include
factors other than free trade. Mention has already been made of Mex-
ico's view of the free trade agreement as a means of encouraging private
sector investment. The United States Department of State appears to be
interested in NAFTA because of its potential to enhance the economy
and thus the political stability of the U.S.'s southern neighbor.
The term "managed trade" has been used to describe agreements
between countries that go beyond merely establishing the rules of trade
and actually determine the outcomes. Both voluntary restraint agree-
ments (VRAs) and quotas have this effect. In fact, managed trade can
amount to a euphemism for protectionism, particularly when quotas or
VRAs are put in place not just for a transitionary period, but
indefinitely.46
The NAFTA may represent an attempt at managed trade, particu-
larly for agricultural products. One researcher has referred to the
NAFTA as "NAMATA"-the North American Managed Agricultural
Trade Agreement.47 The features of the agricultural provisions of the
NAFTA certainly support the view that managed trade is as much the
NAFTA's objective as free trade. However, it is also argued that the
return to quotas and punitive above-quota tariffs for sensitive agricultural
products in the short term (5 to 15 years) provides for an orderly transi-
tion in sectors where the effects of liberalized trade are likely to be felt
the most.
The establishment of a board for settling trade disputes between the
United States and Canada in the CUSTA is regarded by both sides as one
of the most important features of that agreement. A similar body for
resolving trade disputes between Mexico, Canada and the United States
is likely to play an important role in the NAFTA. The NAFRA review
board has more power than the existing CUSTA board because the
NAFTA includes procedures for dealing with noncompliance or nega-
tion of the NAFTA Panel Rulings. The rulings of the NAFTA board
could help counter attempted management of trade for purposes other
46. Lee Smith, A Dangerous Fix for Trade Deficits, FORTUNE, May 4, 1992, at 96, 96-97.
47. John Schildroth, NAFTA: A Canadian Perspective, Paper presented at the Annual Meet-
ing of the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (Dec. 1992).
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than easing the short term adjustment process.48
Given the weak agreement on agricultural trade in the GATT, the
negotiations of a NAFTA seem to offer some real potential for gains.
However, if the agricultural trade provisions in GATT are strengthened,
many of the NAFTA's provisions may offer little more than would have
been gained under GATT.
B. NAFTA with a GATTAgreement
At the insistence of the United States, agriculture was excluded
from the original charter of GATT (Article XI) and has been a problem-
atic area ever since the original agreement was signed by 23 countries in
1947. GATT now has 107 member countries, which account for about
90% of world trade. At the beginning of the Uruguay round in 1986, the
U.S. and Cairns Group (which includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
New Zealand, Thailand, and Uruguay) insisted that major agricultural
trade reform was necessary before agreements in other areas could be
made. The growth in agricultural productivity has surpassed the growth
rate in consumption for most countries. Subsequently, "surplus" pro-
duction has resulted in fierce export competition abroad, declining farm
prices, and increases in government expenditures for farm programs.
As the end of an extended GATT round approached in 1992, it was
clear that no major reforms in agricultural trade would be agreed upon
but that some sort of an agreement was politically necessary. On No-
vember 19, 1992 the United States and EC reached a bilateral agreement
resolving a farm subsidy dispute that related primarily to oilseeds. But
as multilateral talks continued, on December 14 GATT Director-Gen-
eral Arthur Dunkel invited the member nations to reopen talks on details
that were implicitly thought to have been settled.49
Any GATT agreement reached in the near future would have to be
thought of as relatively weak with regard to agricultural products. Most
trade liberalization between the EC and United States will probably oc-
cur in the grains and oilseed sectors with little change for the animal and
sugar sectors. On November 19, the United States and the EC bilaterally
agreed to support a GATT agreement that reduced the volume of agri-
cultural exports that receive subsidies by 21% and reduced subsidy out-
lays by 36%, utilizing a base period of 1986-90. Internally, the EC and
United States have agreed to reduce the average level of domestic farm
48. Id.
49. Uruguay Round Unravelling, THE ECONOMisT, Dec. 26, 1992, at 90-92.
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supports by 20% from a 1986-88 base period. Initial proposals called for
the total elimination of farm subsidies in 10 years. The so-called "Aggre-
gate Measure of Support" (AMS) will be used to determine the amount
of the reduction in farm subsidies. Building a framework such as the
AMS for measuring direct and indirect subsidies may be the most impor-
tant outcome of the Uruguay Round for agriculture, as long as future
negotiations continue the same process. Future negotiations will likely
focus more on domestic supports and environmental issues after trading
policies are settled.
The greatest losers from a weak Uruguay Round will be the con-
sumers in importing countries like Japan and the EC. Agricultural pro-
ducers that are highly efficient, such as the United States and many
Cairns group countries, also "lose" from a weak GATT. But the taxpay-
ers in both exporting and importing countries also lose. Domestic agri-
cultural subsidies could increase as the growth in agricultural
productivity outpaces consumption growth and countries try to maintain
market shares in the face of increasing competition. Furthermore, coun-
tries like Japan and Korea continue to insist on high subsidies for rice as
necessary protection for food security reasons. The implications of these
factors for the NAFTA are that the NAFTA appears to offer notable
liberalization of agricultural trade in North America, at least for long-
term investment decisions.
C. NAFTA as a Trade Bloc
Yet another way to view the NAFTA is as the establishment of a
powerful North American trade bloc in response to the economic inte-
gration of Western European countries and the potential for the forma-
tion of trade blocs in Asia and elsewhere. 0 As part of the means for
establishing a North American trade bloc, the NAFTA is viewed suspi-
ciously by some economists and by countries not included in the bloc.
A trade bloc is a preferential trade agreement between a group of
countries. It can take a variety of forms, some leading to closer economic
integration of countries than others.5 Many such preferential trade
agreements already exist, including the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the
CUSTA, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Lome Con-
vention, and the Australia-New Zealand Trade Agreement.
50. Joseph L. Brand, The New World Order of Regional Trading Blocs, Speech at Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Agricultural Consultants (Oct. 17, 1991); Trade Block Folly,
THE ECONOMiST, Apr. 20, 1991, at 11, 11-12.
51. Brand, supra note 50.
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Trade blocs tend to reduce trade gains globally to the extent that
countries outside the trade bloc have comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of some goods, but are unable to sell these goods to countries
that are part of the bloc because of trade barriers. In a world full of
barriers to trade, it cannot be shown a priori that preferential trade
agreements between a small number of countries are any worse from a
global perspective than no such agreements. To fully evaluate an agree-
ment from a global perspective, it is necessary to examine not only the
impact on members of the agreement, but also the impact on nonmem-
bers. 2 It is also important to note that no global trade agreements cur-
rently exist. Even the GATT does not claim all nations of the world as
members. However, the GATT is open to any country requesting mem-
bership and willing to follow the agreement's provisions.
Most economic trade studies that have examined the impact of pref-
erential trade agreements such as the NAFTA have compared the
amount of additional trade generated by the agreement to the amount of
trade diverted away from countries that are not part of the agreement.
Most of these studies suggest that trade creation has been greater than
trade diversion, with a possible exception in agricultural trade.5 3
A study by Hamilton and Whalley using a trade model consisting of
eight regions suggests that factors other than trade creation/diversion
may affect gains and losses from preferential trade agreements. Such fac-
tors include the pattern of trade between participating and non-partici-
pating countries, the relative sizes of the participating regions, and
whether initial protection is higher in some participating countries than
in others. When a large country negotiates a series of bilateral agree-
ments in a "hub and spoke" arrangement, it is possible for the large
country to exploit both small member countries and trading partners
outside the agreement. 4
What most trade studies have not explicitly taken into account is the
effect of reduced trade barriers on the investment and relocation deci-
sions of multinational corporations (MNCs). National governments can-
not be viewed as the only players in the trade arena in a world where
some MNCs are larger than most countries. Hamilton and Whalley pre-
dict significant gains for Canada under a CUSTA-type agreement Can-
ada and lesser gains for the United States. However, between 1988 and
52. McCalla, supra note 7.
53. Id.
54. Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Geographically Discriminatory Trade Arrangements, 67
REv. ECON. & STAT. 446, 454-55 (1985).
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1991, Canada lost more than 300,000 manufacturing jobs. Although
these losses are not wholly attributable to the agreement, CUSTA did
provide strong incentives for MNCs operating in both the U.S. and Can-
ada to consolidate their operations in one country. Most chose to consol-
idate in the United States.
Although some of the models used to examine the likely impacts of
NAFTA do take into account potential effects on Mexican migration to
the U.S., very few do justice to the migration of capital that could poten-
tially result from the agreement. One study that examines changes in
foreign direct investment by the United States in Mexico suggests that
such flows will further increase benefits for Mexico in terms of jobs and
exports." To quote Adams: "NAFTA is really about capital move-
ments, transfer of technology and location of production."56 Models dis-
tinguishing between businesses with investments in multiple countries
compared to those based in only one country might shed additional light
on the distribution of benefits and losses resulting from the NAFTA.
From a national perspective, even when one country has an absolute
advantage in the production of all goods, it can still benefit from trade, as
demonstrated in the example in Part II. From the perspective of the
individual firm, however, there may be little advantage to maintaining
production in two countries when one country has an absolute or even a
competitive advantage. One effect of NAFTA may be to induce compa-
nies based in the United States and other MNCs to move manufacturing
operations not only out of the United States, but also out of other non-
member countries (particularly in Asia) to Mexico. The magnitude of
such moves could exceed those caused by trade diversion according to
existing trade models.
Alternatively, MNCs may purchase more Mexican-made parts.
Although under the maquiladora program the U.S. was the major source
of parts for assembly operations in Mexico, this need not be the case
under NAFTA. Content rules will apply, but will include producers
from all three nations. Mexican suppliers or suppliers of other nationali-
ties based in Mexico may be in prime position to become the source for
parts used in many of the assembly operations in Mexico.
This is all the more possible given the vertical disintegration that is
occurring in most large firms, including MNCs. Purchasing components
55. F. Gerard Adams et al., The Mexico-United States Free Trade and Investment Area Propo-
sal: A Macroeconometric Evaluation of Impacts on Mexico, 14 J. POL'Y MODELING 99-119 (1992).
56. Vikra R. Khanna, Prospects for EMU and Impact of NAFTA Examined at Conference, IMF
SURVEY (Jan. 25, 1993).
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or parts from small specialized firms gives these large companies more
flexibility in selecting low cost suppliers and in coercing smaller supply
companies to meet their specifications. Small batch runs and flexible pro-
duction make it easier for small suppliers to gear up to meet specifica-
tions to fulfill an order. These factors add up to a much more
competitive manufacturing environment and help explain why many
products contain components from around the world. The NAFTA
might not change this scenario dramatically, but it would certainly give
Mexico a competitive edge.
This is not to suggest that NAFTA is necessarily a bad agreement.
However, until models are developed that better account for the activity
of MNCs and for sourcing activities of vertically disintegrating firms, the
impacts of the agreement may not be understood as well as they should
be to make good policy decisions.
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the NAFTA is the specter of
economic warfare between European, American and Asian trade blocs
looming in the future. On the other hand, the U.S. motivation for negoti-
ating the NAFTA includes a strong political element, and Mexico is
clearly interested in locking in major domestic economic reforms and
encouraging investment. These are not particularly sinister motives for
forming a free trade area, although they are clearly not the only ones at
play.
If the agricultural trade provisions of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT had made significant strides toward reducing global agricultural
trade barriers, then the gains from trade under the NAFTA would be
very small indeed. However, given the rather weak agreement that is
emerging from this round of the GAT, the NAFTA begins to offer
some significant gains. In addition, if the NAFTA combined with other
economic reforms in Mexico is sufficient to generate significant increases
in investment in Mexico, then the effects on North American trade, in-
cluding agricultural trade, could be amplified. In all of the analysis to
date, however, information on the relative impacts of NAFTA on busi-
nesses that operate in more than one country versus those that do not,
and the related implications for movement of production and capital
both within the free trade area and between that area and the rest of the
world is notably absent.
As is pointed out in Part IV, differences in phytosanitary standards
between the United States, Canada, and Mexico will continue to impede
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the free trade of some agricultural products. In addition, comparative
advantage may shift from one country to another for fresh fruits and
vegetables, depending on the season. Finally, the agreement on agricul-
tural trade over the next five to fifteen years is much more akin to man-
aged than free trade for certain sensitive agricultural products, including
some horticultural products, peanuts and sugar exported to the U.S.
from Mexico, and grains and oilseeds exported to Mexico from the
United States. An optimist might suggest that by the time trade barriers
between the United States and Mexico in these areas truly fall, the next
round of the GATT may have successfully concluded with major reduc-
tions in global agricultural trade barriers. GATT spectators and com-
mentators do not expect any immediate agreement on agriculture, but
this scenario is certainly more pleasant to contemplate than a world full
of trade blocs, each fortified with high external trade barriers.
The NAFTA thus seems at least to be a step in the direction of
liberalizing trade in North America. Whether it will live up to its prom-
ise, however, remains to be seen.
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